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Abstract: It has been suggested that the distribution of refugees over host countries can be made
more fair or efficient if policy makers take into account not only numbers of refugees to be distributed
but also the goodness of the matches between refugees and their possible host countries. There are
different ways to design distribution mechanisms that incorporate this practice, which opens up
a space for normative considerations. In particular, if the mechanism takes countries’ or refugees’
preferences into account, there may be trade-offs between satisfying their preferences and the number
of refugees distributed. This article argues that, in such cases, it is not a reasonable policy to
satisfy preferences. Moreover, conditions are given which, if satisfied, prevent the trade-off from
occurring. Finally, it is argued that countries should not express preferences over refugees, but rather
that priorities for refugees should be imposed, and that fairness beats efficiency in the context of
distributing asylum. The framework of matching theory is used to make the arguments precise,
but the results are general and relevant for other distribution mechanisms such as the relocations
currently in effect in the European Union.
Keywords: refugees; distribution mechanism; asylum policy; relocation; market design;
matching theory
1. Introduction
Recently there has been increasing interest not only in the number of refugees that countries
(should) accept, but also in achieving good “matches” between refugees and their host countries.
For example, the mechanism for relocating refugees from Greece and Italy to other member states of
the European Union (EU) seeks to realise this goal by allowing countries offering relocation to indicate
preferences over refugees [1]. Good matches are important because a refugee’s international protection
needs, and her opportunities to flourish, are served differently in different countries. Moreover, a
country’s costs for hosting refugees and the public opinion towards them may differ for different types
of refugees, which may affect policy makers’ willingness to comply with international legal norms [2].
The question of how to distribute asylum amounts to a problem of designing refugee distribution
mechanisms according to criteria that may be considered desirable or morally required. Relevant
criteria may include maximising the number of places for refugees, fairness, or efficiency considerations.
The aim of this paper is to provide some insights into the normative issues that the design of distribution
mechanisms raises. One important issue is this: satisfying refugees’ or countries’ preferences may in
some cases reduce the number of refugees matched. It is argued here that there is no simple solution
to this problem, and that in instances where a trade-off between the satisfaction of preferences and the
number of refugees matched occurs, it is not a reasonable policy to take preferences into account.
On the positive side, we show that a simple sufficient condition can be given which, if satisfied,
precludes the trade-off from occurring: that all the countries within the system deem all refugees
acceptable, and that all refugees deem all countries acceptable. The latter can only be required if each
refugee’s rights are respected in each country within the system, rather than in the country she is
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matched to alone. This is interpreted as a precondition that must be satisfied for an asylum policy to
reasonably take preferences into account.
Finally, it is argued that, in an appropriate decision framework for asylum, countries should
not be allowed to express preferences over groups of refugees in the first place. Instead, priorities
over refugees should be imposed according to humanitarian factors such as vulnerability, and
according to fairness conditions among the countries within the system. Furthermore, in the context of
distributing asylum, the elimination of justified grievance is arguably a weightier normative criterion
than efficiency considerations.
In order to make the arguments precise, we draw on tools from game theory. The distribution
of asylum is modelled as a (bipartite, many-to-one) matching problem under preferences: refugees and
countries offering asylum make up a two-sided market in which the members of one side are to be
distributed over members of the other side. Moreover, members of the market have preferences over
or may give priority to members of the other side of the market, the satisfaction of which makes for
the goodness of the matchings. Formulating the asylum market in this way allows us to use tools
from matching theory to provide a more precise understanding, and may eventually contribute to the
implementation of more fair or efficient policies. Various social scientists have recently argued for
imposing centralised matching systems and have investigated mechanisms that could be implemented
in different stages of distributing asylum seekers [3–10]. While we are sympathetic to this line of
research, this paper does not directly contribute to it. Rather, it serves as a commentary on normative
issues that typically arise in this context.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next Section 2, our main case study is
introduced: the relocation mechanism that is currently in effect in the EU. The case study naturally
suggests three desiderata on the distribution of refugees that are made precise in Section 3 through
a simple model from matching theory: the College Admissions model. A mechanism that takes
preferences into account is shown to achieve some of the desiderata, but it is then shown that there
may be trade-offs between the desiderata, and so a condition is given to prevent these trade-offs from
occurring. In Section 4, it is shown that the College Admissions model violates the last desideratum
encountered in Section 2: it opens the door to discriminatory policies and unduly favours popular
countries at the expense of less popular ones. This motivates modelling the asylum market as a School
Choice problem. This model is described in Section 5, where it is argued that fairness beats efficiency
in the context of distributing asylum. Section 6 provides the conclusions.
2. Desiderata on the Distribution of Refugees: The EU Relocation Mechanism
To prevent terminological confusion, let refugee denote a recognised refugee or an asylum
seeker with a justified claim to refugee status.1 We are concerned with their distribution on
a supranational scale: refugees are to be distributed over a given set of nation states (henceforth
‘countries’) which—voluntarily or enforced by a superordinate (con)federation government—agree to
be possible host destinations. The distribution problem may either occur in the context of resettlements:
the distribution of refugees from third countries or refugee camps among the countries in the system;
or in the context of relocations: the redistribution of refugees already in a country in the system.
The context determines the number of refugees in the system. This can be a target set by
a superordinate institution (such as the EU’s target to relocate a certain number of refugees), or
the sum of pledges made by the countries within the system (such as some EU member states’ pledges
to resettle a certain number of refugees). Moreover, there may be (although there need not be) quotas:
numbers of refugees that countries will accept. These numbers may either be individual pledges
1 This presupposes a consistent definition of what counts as a justified claim (at least among the countries within the system),
which is a controversial issue (see [11]). For simplicity, this problem will be ignored except for a short discussion in Section 5.
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made by the countries, imposed according to a distribution key [12,13], or the outcome of a market of
tradeable immigration quotas [3].
Let us take a concrete distribution problem as a case study. In September 2015, the European
Commission proposed a mechanism for the relocation of refugees from Greece and Italy among EU
member states. The proposal shows awareness of the importance of good “matches” between refugees
and countries of relocation:
“[I]n order to decide which specific Member State should be the Member State of relocation,
a specific account should be given to the specific qualifications and characteristics of the
applicants concerned, such as their language skills and other individual indications based
on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties that could facilitate their integration into the
Member State of relocation.” [1]
Subsequently, the Council adopted the proposal in a decision on a temporary relocation of
160,000 asylum seekers in clear need of international protection from Greece and Italy [14,15]. In
order to comply with the target of achieving good matches, the relocation mechanism allows member
states of relocation to indicate preferences over refugees who applied for relocation. Greek and Italian
authorities then choose among applicants and thereby “try as much as possible to meet the preferences
expressed” [15]. After determining the matches, they send relocation requests to the countries, which
are legally binding.
The relocations are not running smoothly. Three problems are particularly noticeable. First,
there seems to be considerable discontent with some matches. Many refugees have disappeared
after learning about the decision on their destination country [16]. Others have vanished after
their relocation, and preventing such irregular secondary movements has become a central policy
goal [14,17]; second, the number of refugees distributed lags far behind the policy target. By July 2016,
almost a year after the Commission’s proposal had been adopted, the total number of persons relocated
equalled only 3056, which corresponds to less than 2% of the 160,000 people envisaged [18]. As of
July 2017, the mechanism seems to have gained some traction but still less than 25,000 refugees have
been relocated [19]; third, the preferences some countries express are ethically problematic and in
conflict with the EU’s policy goals. For example, although the Council appealed to the member
states to give priority to particularly vulnerable persons (e.g., unaccompanied minors, pregnant
women, disabled and elderly persons), some member states are reluctant to receive persons from these
groups [16]. Furthermore, although legally required to accept all types of refugees, some member
states have rejected allocations on the grounds that their preferences were not respected [16].
The problems with the EU relocation mechanism motivate three desiderata on asylum matchings
that will be adopted in this discussion. First, available places should be used efficiently (in a sense
to be specified). Roughly, the refugees’ or countries’ preferences should be satisfied “as much as
possible”, in particular in order to minimise refugees’ incentives to vanish or partake in secondary
movements; second, the number of refugees matched should be maximised and should possibly equal
the policy goal; third, the system should ban an “incorrect use of preferences” [16]: preferences should
be expressed in line with fundamental ethical principles and higher-order policy goals.
The desiderata can be defined precisely within the framework of matching theory, which shall be
introduced next.
3. Asylum as College Admissions Problem
Matching under preferences is a tool from cooperative game theory. It can be applied to two-sided
markets in which heterogeneous agents, or goods, of one side are to be distributed over agents or
goods of the other side of the market, and the satisfaction of agents’ preferences, or respect for agents’
priorities, matter. Gale and Shapley [20] laid the theoretical foundations for the theory. Centralised
matching systems have since been implemented in different contexts such as matching students to
universities, job-seekers to employment, or kidney donors to patients.
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Various economists and political scientists have argued that implementing a matching system
in the context of asylum would be beneficial for refugees, or their possible host countries.
Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport [3–5] use a matching system embedded in the tradeable
immigration quotas system they propose for, among other things, the distribution of refugees over
EU countries. Furthermore, Jones and Teytelboym advertise the implementation of matching systems
both on a local [6] and on a global [7] scale. Delacrétaz, Kominers and Teytelboym [9] propose
specific mechanisms for locally matching refugees with communities in different institutional and
informational settings; and Andersson and Ehlers [10] design a matching system in the context of
assigning private housing to refugees in Sweden.
Rather than argue for a specific matching system, or matching systems generally, our interest here
is to show that matching theory yields insights that are important for the ethics of asylum distribution.
The main difference between the EU’s relocation mechanism and a centralised matching system is
that, in the latter, the matchings are determined through the application of a mechanical procedure.
The resulting matchings can be compared along the same properties, however, and thus the desiderata
within the framework of matching theory and the theoretical results hold equally for contexts such as
the relocations in the EU.
Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport [3] propose implementing a College Admissions (CA)
model on the asylum market. This model resembles our case study in that it takes into account the
preferences countries have over (groups of) refugees, which is why it serves as a natural starting
point. It differs from the case study in that members of either side of the market are equally treated
as agents with preferences over members of the other side of the market: countries have preferences
over refugees and refugees have preferences over countries, which is why the CA model allows for
more general mechanisms than the EU’s relocation mechanism which only takes countries’ preferences
into account. A matching affects the countries’ and refugees’ welfare relative to the satisfaction of
their preferences.
Formally,2 a CA-instance of a refugee-country matching problem is a four-tuple (C, R, q,P), where
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and R = {r1, . . . , rn} are disjoint sets of m countries and n refugees, respectively.
The agents of the market are the members ak ∈ R ∪ C. We are concerned with many-to-one matchings
since it can be assumed that n m and each refugee can obtain asylum in at most one country, whereas
a given country can accept many refugees. The maximum number of refugees that can be matched to
each country is determined by a vector of quotas q = (qj)j∈{1,...,m} ∈ Nm. As described in the previous
section, quotas may be imposed according to a distribution key, the outcome in a market of tradeable
immigration quotas, or may be individually set by the countries; or there may be no real quotas at all:
setting qj = n for all cj ∈ C makes them dummies. Finally, P = {P(c1), . . . , P(cm), P(r1), . . . , P(rn)} is
a set of preference lists which induces a complete, transitive, and irreflexive preference profile for each
country over the set of refugees and for each refugee over the set of countries. Write c1 ri c2 to denote
that ri prefers c1 to c2, and equivalently for countries’ preferences.
Refugees may declare countries unacceptable, and countries may declare refugees unacceptable.
Hence, there is a subset E ⊆ R×C of acceptable refugee-country pairs. Denote A(ri) = {cj|(ri, cj) ∈ E}
the set of acceptable countries for a given ri ∈ R; and equivalently for the countries.
An assignment M is a subset of E, and the set of assignees for a given ak ∈ R ∪ C is denoted
M(ak). A refugee ri can be unassigned so M(ri) = ∅, or otherwise assigned. Similarly, a country cj is
undersubscribed if |M(cj)| < qj, and full if |M(cj)| = qj.
Definition 1 (Matching). A matching is an assignment with
(i) |M(ri)| ≤ 1 for all ri ∈ R; and
(ii) |M(cj)| ≤ qj for all cj ∈ C.
2 Our notation loosely follows [21].
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According to (i), a given refugee is either assigned to a single country or unassigned under a
matching. As usual in the literature, M(ri) may be used sloppily to refer to the country to which ri is
matched instead of the singleton containing that country, whenever this does not cause confusion.
What (ii) says is that a given country accepts a subset of the set of refugees, the cardinality of
which is restricted by the country’s quota. In the following, say equivalently that ri is matched to cj
and that cj is matched to ri under M if (ri, cj) ∈ M.
3.1. Stability and Deferred Acceptance Algorithms
We can now turn to the desiderata encountered in the previous section. It will be argued that the
desideratum that preferences be satisfied “as much as possible” amounts to stability (ST) in the CA
model. We shall first define this property and introduce an algorithm that produces matchings that
satisfy (ST).
A matching M is blocked by a refugee-country pair (ri, cj) ∈ E \ M if ri is unassigned in M or
prefers cj to M(ri), and at the same time cj is undersubscribed in M or prefers ri to a member of M(cj).
A matching satisfies (ST) if it is not blocked by any refugee-country pair.
Deferred acceptance algorithms produce matchings that satisfy (ST) for each CA-instance [20];
in the following, call such mechanisms stable. Consider the following “country-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm”, µC:
• In the first step, each country proposes its most preferred acceptable refugees until its quota is
filled. Each refugee tentatively accepts her most preferred country among the acceptable proposers
and rejects the other proposers.
• In the second step, each undersubscribed country proposes to the next best preferred acceptable
refugees to whom it has not yet proposed until its quota is filled. Each refugee tentatively accepts
her most preferred country among the acceptable proposers and the country she tentatively
accepted in the previous step, and rejects the other proposers.
• The process is repeated until there are no more proposals.3
The ending condition applies when either all refugees are matched, or all countries are full,
or there are unmatched refugees and undersubscribed countries but all such agents are deemed
unacceptable by the remaining partners they find acceptable. For an illustration of the algorithm,
consider a small CA-instance.
Example 1. There are three refugees, r1, r2, r3, and two countries c1, c2 with q1 = 2 and q2 = 1. The preference
relations are as specified in Table 1.
Table 1. Table specifying refugees’ and countries’ preferences for Example 1. a c b denotes that c
strictly prefers a to b.
Countries Refugees
r1 c1 r2 c1 r3 c2  c1 for both r1 and r2
r2 c2 r1 c2 r3 r3 declares only c2 acceptable
3 We must add two qualifications. First, µC is a simple algorithm which is not fit for purpose. For example, it
cannot accommodate the fact that many refugees flee as couples or in families that should not be separated. It is
nevertheless introduced in order to make clear the ethical problem that the size and the “quality” of matchings can be in
conflict—a problem which is present in more complex algorithms (e.g., [9]). Second, µC is not the only stable mechanism.
The reason it is presented here is that it is the deferred acceptance algorithm which is arguably closest to implementing the
mechanism used in the EU relocations in which the countries “pick” refugees according to their preferences. But whereas
µC also respects the refugees’ preferences, they are not taken into consideration in the EU mechanism. Whether a country-
or a refugee-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is preferable is debatable as both have pros and cons (for example,
Ref. [3] proposes µC , whereas Ref. [7] prefers a refugee-proposing algorithm). For our purposes, nothing hinges on this
question and our arguments in the following hold equally for other deferred acceptance algorithms.
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Apply µC. In the first step, c1 proposes to r1 and r2, and c2 proposes to r2. r2 tentatively accepts c2
and rejects c1, and r1 tentatively accepts c1. c1 has a free place. In the second step, c1 proposes to r3 and r3
rejects. c1 has a free place but no more refugees to propose to so the algorithm stops. The resulting matching is
((c1, r1), (c2, r2)).
It can easily be checked that the matching is stable. For example, r1 prefers c2 to her actual match,
c1. However, c2 does not form a blocking pair with r1 because it is full and prefers its actual match to
r1. Similarly for the unmatched r3.
Why does (ST) in the CA model amount to satisfying preferences “as much as possible”? First,
it implies Pareto efficiency in the CA model: agents could only be made better off by making other
agents worse off. (It can easily be verified that this is true in the above example.)
Second, a distribution that satisfies (ST) can be considered to be fair in the following sense. Only
if c2 had free places available or preferred r1 to its actual match would r1 have a justified claim to
be matched to c2, but this is ruled out because the matching is stable. This lack of justified claims is
what makes for a fair distribution. Note that this condition may not be sufficient for eliminating all
discontent with the matchings: it does not imply that all agents get what they want most (which is
usually impossible, see Example 1). It only implies that they are matched to an acceptable partner and
that they are not matched to a less preferred partner when a more preferred partner would be available.
Third, the sense of fairness (ST) conveys can be expected to contribute to the thickness of the
market: it gives agents on both sides incentives to participate in the system. Conversely, if (ST) is
violated, both sides of the market may be dissatisfied. There is ample evidence that in many contexts,
agents seek to arrange bilateral arrangements outside the system when this happens (e.g., in the
context of matching doctors with hospitals [22–24]). Note that the EU relocation mechanism violates
(ST) in a specific way: it does not systematically take refugees’ preferences into account, thus resulting
in matchings that can be considered unfair for refugees. In this context, it may be difficult for refugees
to arrange bilateral arrangements outside the system. Nevertheless, the failure to take their preferences
into account may contribute to the finding from the previous section that many vanish after learning
about their destination countries, or partake in illegal secondary movements.
3.2. Maximum Cardinality vs. Stability
Consider now the next desideratum encountered in Section 2. Call the number of refugees
assigned in a matching its cardinality. The cardinality of a matching depends on the set of acceptable
refugee–country pairs, i.e., the set E ⊆ R× C.4 Call maximum cardinality (MC) the desideratum that
matchings should not waste places. More precisely, for a given CA-instance, a matching M satisfies
(MC) if and only if |M| ≥ |M′| for all matchings M′.
In Example 1 above, ((c1, r1), (c1, r2), (c2, r3)) is the unique maximum cardinality matching. It is
not stable because (c2, r1) and (c2, r2) are blocking pairs: both r1 and r2 prefer c2 to c1, and at the
same time c2 prefers both r1 and r2 to r3. In contrast, remember that applying µC produced the stable
matching ((c1, r1), (c2, r2)), leaving r3 unmatched and c1 undersubscribed. Thus, satisfying (ST) comes
at the price of failing to satisfy (MC).
The fact that (MC) and (ST) may conflict poses a problem because both (MC) and (ST) have
normative appeal. In many contexts where matching theory is applied, (ST) is the primary policy goal,
and there is some loss in the size of the matchings allowed for because it can be compensated through
4 The cardinality of matchings also crucially depends on countries’ quotas which are taken as exogenous variables here.
In passing, note that in contexts in which countries state voluntary quotas the application of deferred acceptance algorithms
is problematic because they generate incentives to capacity-manipulate: countries may gain by stating smaller quotas.
As shown in [25], there is no stable mechanism that is immune to capacity-manipulation. Hence, µC combined with
voluntary quotas would incentivise countries to enter a race of diminishing their stated capacities—which is an extremely
undesirable consequence for a good in short supply, and may serve as an argument against voluntary quotas.
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different instruments from market design. Two such instruments shall be discussed briefly and shown
to be inadequate in the context of the asylum market. This suggests that there is no simple resolution
to the problem.
First, in the matching markets for medical residents or for new economists, so-called “scrambles”
have been established for unmatched and undersubscribed agents. These are decentralised post-match
markets where available agents of both sides of the market can find each other and positions can
be filled [26]. However, the fundamental difference between matching asylum and contexts where
matching theory is usually applied is that in those contexts, both sides of the market have incentives
to fill available places. In the context of asylum, many countries have opposite incentives, and few
countries not filling their quotas would advertise this in a scramble. A scramble is thus unlikely to be
efficient or even to emerge in the first place.
Second, countries unable to fill their quotas may be penalised.5 Penalties are often difficult to
impose, however, even when countries’ participation in a relocation mechanism is obligatory. In the
EU context, for example, it has been proposed that countries not filling their quotas pay a fine of
250,000 Euros for every assigned place that remains empty. What the prospects are for this proposal is
questionable, however, as various countries, most notably members of the Visegrad Group, are virtually
boycotting the relocations. Moreover, Hungary and Slovakia took legal steps against the relocations
and refused to accept any more refugees before a verdict would be announced [27]. The European
Court of Justice dismissed the suit on September 6 [28], but Hungary’s prime minister declared that
this won’t change Hungary’s policy of not participating in relocations [29]. While it may be possible to
penalise Hungary for not complying with the EU regulations in the future, the process can be expected
to be long and politically tedious.
Besides worries about the prospects for implementing penalties, note that they may make the
system manipulable for the refugees: it may pay to be “picky”. This is the case when the revenues
from the penalties are used to provide more asylum places elsewhere, thus in the best case satisfying
(MC). In Example 1, applying µC, r1 gets assigned to her least preferred country, c1. Now, suppose
that for each place that remains empty, c1 is penalised and with the help of the penalty, a place is
created elsewhere. If r1 prefers a place elsewhere to c1, she would gain by declaring c1 unacceptable
even though she finds it acceptable. Although these are not definite reasons for the intractability of
imposing penalties, they do suggest some caution: imposing penalties may be difficult, and may lead
to undesirable incentive structures. Since these issues do not seem to have a definite solution at present,
penalties will be neglected in the following.6
Whenever (ST) and (MC) are in conflict, we must bite the bullet and give up one of the
desiderata. Which one? Consider again Example 1. Suppose r3 is justified in declaring c1 unacceptable.
For example, she may belong to an ethnic or religious group that is persecuted in c1 (and suppose r1
and r2 do not belong to such a group). Refugee r3 is then in a particularly disadvantaged situation
because she cannot expect protection in one of the countries within the system. By assigning her to
the acceptable country c2, the maximum matching gives priority to r3. Since priority is given to the
5 Penalties are proposed in [3] in the context of a market of tradeable immigration quotas, where the penalty is a function of
the difference of the quota negotiated and the number of refugees assigned to the country under µC .
6 For more arguments against penalties, cf. [7]. A third resort to fix the problem is to internalise it in the matching system
by imposing minimum quotas. This strategy is not relevant here because the context of asylum is different to the setting
where minimum quotas are usually investigated. For example, Fragiadakis, D., et al. [30] investigate minimum quotas
in the context of school choice. They assume that all schools are acceptable to all students and vice versa, and look at
the case where the number of students is strictly between the sum of the schools’ minimum quotas and the sum of the
schools’ maximum quotas. In the case where the number of students exceeds the number of places available—which is to be
expected in the context of asylum—minimum quotas are dummies in this setting. In contrast, the problem we are concerned
with is the case in which places may be wasted due to size of the set of acceptable refugee-country pairs. The special case
where students may declare schools unacceptable is considered in [30], but their mechanisms allow violating minimum
quotas and don’t satisfy (MC).
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worst-off, (MC) could be interpreted as a prioritarianist condition [31,32]. It is moreover a condition
that the Rawlsian maximin principle [33] would embrace.
Giving priority to the worst-off may come at the cost of making other agents in the market worse
off. In the example, r2 and c2 are worse-off in the maximum matching than in the stable matching.
As we have seen, (ST) implies Pareto efficiency in the CA model, and has been interpreted in this
model as the desideratum that agents’ preferences should be satisfied “as much as possible”. Thus, in
contrast to (MC), (ST) in the CA model can be approximately characterised as “utilitarian” (e.g., [34]).7
Which condition should be prioritised? Arguably, in the context of asylum in which by definition,
people are in disadvantaged and vulnerable situations, it is a more reasonable policy to give priority
to the worst-off. There is empirical evidence that this agrees with a widespread intuition in many
receiving countries [2]. This suggests that satisfying preferences is not a reasonable policy in instances
in which it violates maximum cardinality.
A second reason for giving priority to (MC) over (ST) is that asylum is a public good and is as
such in constant short supply [3]. For example, remember that the total number of persons relocated
in the EU up to July 2016 was less than 2% of the 160,000 people envisaged [16]. On a larger scale, the
UN Refugee Agency [35] estimates the projected global resettlement needs in 2017 more than seven
times higher (over 1.19 million) than the sum of the expected global quotas from resettlement countries
(170,000). The gap between demand and supply is so blatant that the desideratum to bring many
refugees into a safe harbour trumps the desideratum to satisfy “as much as possible” the preferences
of fewer.
3.3. When Preferences Can Be Taken into Account
It is also possible to investigate the conditions under which (ST) and (MC) are jointly satisfied.
For example, Andersson and Ehlers [10] design a mechanism that produces maximum stable matchings
for assigning refugee families to landlords in Sweden. In that context, maximum stable matchings
exists because refugees’ and landlords’ preferences only range over common languages spoken and
the sizes of families, and are assumed to be correlated in a specific way. In the present context of
distributing refugees over countries, preference structures are more complex. However, a simple
sufficient condition can be given: note that (ST) and (MC) conflict only if some countries deem some
refugees unacceptable, or if some refugees deem some countries unacceptable. Recall that E ⊆ R× C
denotes the set of acceptable refugee-country pairs, so that E = R× C indicates that everyone finds
everyone acceptable. Then, we have the following simple fact.
Proposition 1. In CA-instances in which E = R× C, stable maximum matchings exist.
Proof of Proposition. Suppose E = R× C in a given CA-instance. It can be shown that the stable
mechanism µC provides a maximum matching. Applying µC, a refugee ri accepts any country cj’s
proposal in a step n unless in some step up to n, a preferred country has proposed to ri. Recall that
qj denotes country j’s quota. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose there are more places
than refugees, i.e., |R| < ∑mk=1 qk. Each refugee who gets a proposal at some point will get matched
because she only rejects if she already has a better offer. However, each refugee gets a proposal at
some point because E = R× C. Thus, the resulting matching M has a cardinality equal to the number
of refugees, |M| = |R|, and so M is maximum. Second, suppose the number of refugees exceeds or
equals the sum of all quotas, i.e., |R| ≥ ∑mk=1 qk. Because E = R× C every country will fill its quota,
and |M| = ∑mk=1 qk. Hence, M is again maximum.
7 This is not a precise characterisation because the matching framework introduced here does not allow for cardinal utilities
which are required for utilitarianism to be a meaningful doctrine. The labelling as “utilitarian” is a mere approximation.
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Although this is a very simple fact, it leads to interesting moral considerations. Can we require as
a policy that every country deems every refugee acceptable and vice versa? The former is the case
in the context of the EU’s relocation mechanism: member states are required to accept all types of
refugees, not only those on their preference lists ([14]).8 The reason this is required is that unilaterally
declaring groups of refugees unacceptable may open the door to discriminatory policies. Moreover,
it would allow countries to “play dummy”: by stating a small or empty preference list, countries
could participate in the system without fulfilling their quotas. It is reported in [16] that this has indeed
happened in the context of relocations in the EU—although it is an illegal practice—and that member
states are urged to refrain from it. Thus, for the initiators of the EU relocation mechanism, it seems
uncontroversial that countries must accept all types of refugees, and the problem is rather to enforce
this rule. However this may be enforced in practice, the CA model must be modified by imposing
the restriction that the countries’ preference profiles range over the whole set of refugees; formally,
A(cj) = R for all cj ∈ C.
To require that all refugees deem all countries acceptable is more problematic. As shown in the
above example, if it is to be expected that in a given country the rights of a certain group of refugees
are violated, then refugees who belong to this group can justifiably refuse to go there. Reasons for
justified refusal include denial of non-discriminatory access to national services and public goods.
However, if it is the case that in each country within the system all refugees’ rights are respected,
refugees can be expected to deem all countries acceptable. Suppose the sum of the available places
equals the number of refugees within the system. The following may then be considered a condition of
fairness: a given refugee gets matched if she declares all countries acceptable. (The proof is a trivial
extension of the proposition above.) In other words, if a refugee is willing to be matched with any
country within the system she is guaranteed a place. This fairness condition agrees with the European
Commission’s proposal where refugees’ successful applications to the relocation scheme do not imply
a choice as to which country they move but do imply a relocation [16].
To sum up, if refugees’ rights are respected in each country within the system, then it can be
required that “everyone finds everyone acceptable”, which guarantees that (ST) and (MC) can jointly be
satisfied. However, whenever the set of countries includes a country where some minorities’ rights are
violated—although for other groups it may be a safe harbour—refugees that belong to these minorities
cannot be expected to deem that country acceptable. (ST) should then be given up: in such instances,
it is not a reasonable policy to take preferences into account. The trade-off between (ST) and (MC)
can thus be interpreted as delimiting the area where preference satisfaction is a desirable policy goal.
In the remainder of this article, it is assumed that the condition of no rights violations is met, and thus
that a maximum stable matching exists.
4. Compliance with Higher-Order Policy Goals and Ethical Principles
In this section, it is argued that, even if the requirement of no rights violation is met and a
modified CA model adopted in which “everyone finds everyone acceptable”, this model must be
rejected. The reason is that the CA model conflicts with the third desideratum encountered in Section
2: that the system should ban the possibility of “incorrect use of preferences” [16]. An “incorrect use of
preferences” is an expression of preferences which are in conflict with higher-order policy goals or
ethical principles. Call this desideratum on the system compliance (COM). Compliance is also violated
if agents can “game the system”, i.e., achieve a more preferred matching by handing in preference lists
strategically. It is a well-known result in matching theory that no stable mechanism is strategy-proof
in the CA model [36]. In the following, two additional lines will be discussed along which (COM) is
8 Cf. “Member States retain the right to refuse to relocate an applicant only where there are reasonable grounds for regarding
him or her as a danger to their national security or public order”, and: “Member States of relocation...should be ready to
welcome all types of migrants (families, unaccompanied minors, single male applicants).” [14].
Games 2017, 8, 41 10 of 19
violated in the CA model: the model enables the expression of impermissible preferences; and popular
countries may be unduly favoured at the expense of less popular countries.
4.1. Impermissible Preferences of the Countries
So far, a model has been assumed in which countries have strict and complete preferences over
refugees. In practice, since the number of refugees may be large, countries cannot give strict preference
lists over refugees. Rather, countries have preferences over groups of refugees that are identified
through a classification according to properties the countries are interested in, for example profession,
languages spoken, family status, urgency, etc. Suppose such a classification system is available.
Countries are then indifferent between members of one and the same group, and a tiebreaker must be
applied in order for the system to work.9
The task of designing a feasible classification system immediately gives rise to ethical problems:
what properties of refugees can permissibly figure in countries’ preferences? It has been argued that
immigrants should generally not be selected on grounds of ethnicity, and that countries’ preferences
should be restricted to range over “neutral” properties such as particular skills [39]. This principle
should arguably also be applied in the context of asylum. It also agrees with the EU’s relocation
mechanism, which allows member states to express their preferences over refugees, albeit with “due
respect of the principle of non-discrimination” [1].
It is, however, hardly possible to entirely ban the use of ethically impermissible preferences in
the CA model if there are countries in the system with such preferences. Restrictions can be imposed
on the classification system—e.g., that preferences along ethnicity be forbidden. However, ethnicities
also determine other features that are present in any reasonable classification system, such as mother
tongue. Correlations between different such factors may make it possible to game the system, thereby
violating (COM).10
Even if it is possible to design a classification system that cannot be manipulated in this way,
countries’ preferences may still conflict with ethical principles and higher-order policy goals. The EU
relocation mechanism provides plenty of evidence. For example, Commission [16] urges countries to
express preferences in line with the policy goal “to facilitate integration of the relocated person in the
Member State of relocation”. However, “the majority of Member States use the preferences as a means
to exclude possible candidates rather than to allow for a better matching process for better integration”.
As a consequence, it is demanded that “Member States of relocation should limit to the extent possible
the preferences expressed” (ibid.). However, this stands in stark contrast to the rules of the relocation
mechanism, which allow countries to express preferences in order to achieve good matches. It also
stands in contrast to the CA model.
4.2. Unequal Treatment of Countries
Another important policy goal in the EU’s relocation mechanism is to achieve equal treatment of
countries. For example, concerning particularly vulnerable applicants, the Council urges “the necessity
of ensuring a fair distribution of those applicants among Member States” [14]. Equal treatment of
countries is desirable both for fairness considerations and because it may be practically infeasible
to impose a system in which some countries are worse off than others. If the system cannot ban the
9 This is usually a randomisation device, which has problematic consequences. For some strict CA-instances obtained
by breaking the ties the matchings produced by deferred acceptance algorithms may be Pareto dominated for the
refugees by others. The algorithms may be modified to solve for Pareto efficient matchings but only at the cost of
strategy-proofness [37,38]. This may pose a problem in practice; for simplicity, it will not figure in the arguments given here.
10 Miller [39] excludes this on grounds of “good faith”. However, as regards asylum, good faith is a weak hope to rely on in
reality, particularly considering that many EU countries have not complied with their humanitarian responsibilities during
the refugee crisis [40].
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expression of preferences that leads to unequal treatment of countries, then there is a violation of
(COM). However, the CA model may violate (COM) in this respect, in the following way.
In a usual asylum market, there are more and less popular countries for large proportions
of refugees, i.e., their preferences are correlated. If refugees’ preference relations are sufficiently
homogeneous, then deferred acceptance algorithms (and hence µC) in the CA model show favouritism
to the most popular countries. For example, suppose there are two countries, HI and LO, and 100
refugees r1, . . . , r100, all of whom prefer HI to LO. Applying µC, HI can “cherry-pick” its favourite
group of refugees until its quota is satisfied. The problem is that LO’s preferences are not at all taken
into account: under any possible preference list, it will be assigned the same refugees. Moreover, it
implies a practical problem: why should LO be willing to join the system? However, if countries that
consider themselves on the “losing side” are discouraged from participating in the system, this may
produce a market that is too short on the supply side if participation is voluntary, or no market at all if
they are co-policy setters with sufficient weight.
Are refugees’ preferences really so homogeneous that popular countries would be shown
favouritism at the expense of unpopular countries? This question has not been answered conclusively.
First of all, it is not clear how to set the threshold of when unacceptable favouritism begins. However,
even if this is settled, so far not much data have been collected as to the actual preferences of refugees,
and it is difficult to infer from the total or relative numbers of past asylum applications in a given
country to the popularity of that country; for asylum seekers may not have had a choice in where to
apply for asylum. It seems a risky policy to implement a system in which popular countries are shown
favouritism if refugees’ preferences are homogeneous given that it is an open question whether their
preferences are indeed too homogeneous.
Furthermore, there are indicators suggesting that refugees’ preferences are relatively
homogeneous. Two of the most important factors that shape refugees’ preferences are family and
diaspora in a country (e.g., [41]; on a local level also [42]). These factors agglomerate the preferences
of a population of refugees from a given country or region and make them more homogeneous than
those of populations from different countries or regions. The fact that the main population of current
asylum seekers is centred on few countries11 may be evidence that their preference relations are
relatively homogeneous.
It has been argued in [7] that one can turn the tables on homogeneity of preferences. The risk of
homogeneity may have positive effects on the market, so the argument goes, because countries will
have incentives to court refugees in order to become popular destinations. This, however, seems to
be an overly optimistic claim. A country may be unattractive for reasons that cannot be eliminated
by changing its incentives—particularly, economic reasons. It seems that this country would then be
unjustly disadvantaged in the CA model, if refugees’ preferences are homogeneously biased against
it. Moreover, the argument does not address the problem that the market may not even come into
existence if states are not interested in “courting” refugees, especially if they consider themselves on
the losing side as a consequence of past deterrence of refugees.
Moreover, the incentives argument can be turned around. As discussed in the previous section,
refugees can be expected to deem a country acceptable only if their rights are respected there. However,
a country interested in diminishing the number of refugees matched to it may have incentives to
deter them from coming through drastic messages, or even to violate the rights of refugees already in
the country in order to achieve this goal. Such policies are in effect in various countries all over the
world,12 and the fact that the CA model may enforce the incentives for such policies casts doubt on its
normative desirability and effective operation.
11 In 2015, almost one out of three first time asylum seekers entering the EU originated from Syria, followed by Afghanistan
(14%) and Iraq (11%) [43,44].
12 For example, Hungary has been accused of criminalising and thereby violating refugees’ rights, e.g., [45,46]. Similar
reproaches have been addressed to Australia, e.g., [47].
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Summing up, the CA model not only makes it difficult to prevent discriminatory policies. It also
likely disadvantages some countries at the expense of others, thus provoking inequality among the
countries and yielding undesirable incentive structures. The CA model violates (COM) in these
respects, and, arguably, this is sufficient reason to reject the CA model for the asylum market.
5. Asylum as School Choice Problem
In the previous section, we encountered two lines along which the CA model violates (COM).
First, even if the classification of refugees is restricted to “neutral” properties, it cannot be ruled
out that some countries are manipulating the system by “incorrectly” expressing preferences [16].
Second, popular countries’ preferences likely receive overproportional weight at the expense of less
popular countries.
What drives both problems is that countries are allowed to state preferences over groups of
refugees. This motivates the following modification of the system. Refugees’ preferences are taken
into account, as before. However, countries are not considered economic agents with preferences over
the people they provide with asylum; instead, asylum in a country is an object to be consumed by an
asylum seeker. It is an object in short supply, but at the same time, it would be repugnant to sell it on a
free market, in the sense of [48]: many people think such transactions should not occur even if agents
in the market would voluntarily engage in them.
How should asylum be distributed, if not through a free market? Arguably, a country should
give its available places to the applicants who need it most or would most profit from it. This may be
determined through priorities for certain features of refugees. Priorities may comprise features such as
vulnerability, urgency, dependants in a country, languages spoken, specific skills, etc. (these examples
are policy goals set by the Council [14,15]). Criteria for setting priorities must be commonly agreed
on, plausibly in conformance with a supranational institution such as the European Parliament, and
should comprise only “neutral” properties. For example, a country could be allowed to prioritise
refugees who speak its language but should not be allowed to prioritise race [7]. National governments
could then determine which features to prioritise while respecting the criteria agreed on.
In terms of matching theory, this suggests modelling asylum as a School Choice (SC) problem.
The SC model was developed for the assignment of pupils to public schools in US school districts.
In this context, schools are not assumed to be strategic agents, and it is only the pupils’ welfare that
matters [49]. Formally, the SC model can be attained from the CA model by restricting the set of
preference lists to the refugees, and defining priority lists for the countries. Thus, an SC instance of
a refugee-country matching problem is a five-tuple (R, C, q,P,Pri) with P = {P(r1), . . . , P(rn)}, and
where Pri = {Pri(c1), . . . , Pri(cm)} is the set of countries’ priority lists. It is assumed that all refugees
deem all countries acceptable and priorities range over all refugees, so E = R× C. The definition of a
matching is equivalent to that in the CA model.
Priority rankings are usually generated through a point system. If two applicants have identical
points, the priority ranking may be determined through a lottery or continuous factors. In the context
of the refugee match, it seems plausible to give a refugee who has been waiting longer for transfer
more points in all countries’ rankings than to a refugee with less waiting time spent, other things being
equal; so waiting time since registration in the system could be used as a continuous variable to break
non-strict priorities.13
(ST) is in SC-instances usually interpreted as elimination of justified envy [49], but, in the context
of asylum, the term elimination of justified grievance may appear more appropriate. If a refugee does
not get matched to her most preferred destination and the matching satisfies (ST), then she has a
13 Depending on the context, refugees could be registered in member states of the system or hotspots (reception centres in
frontline states within the system), in camps external to the member states of the system, or even in diplomatic missions
such as embassies in the region of origin [50].
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lower priority in that country than all the refugees matched to it and, hence, there is no ground for
grievance. Deferred acceptance algorithms are applicable to SC-instances, and produce matchings that
satisfy (ST). Let µR be the algorithm equivalent to µC but with the roles switched: the refugees propose
and the countries accept the proposals in each step of the refugees with the highest priorities up to
filling the countries’ quotas. µR is typically preferred to µC in the SC model in which only refugees’
welfare is taken into account because it produces the refugee-optimal stable matchings. Moreover,
it is strategy-proof for refugees and thus strategy-proof tout court in a model in which countries are
assumed not to strategise.14
An immediate normative problem that arises when applying the SC model to the distribution of
asylum is that in this model, stability does not imply efficiency [49]. The following example from [36]
illustrates this.
Example 2. There are three refugees, r1, r2, r3, and three countries c1, c2, c3 with q1,2,3 = 1. The refugees’
preferences and priorities are specified in Table 2.
Table 2. Refugees’ preferences and priorities in Example 2.
Pri P
r1 c1 r3 c1 r2 c2 r1 c1 r1 c3
r2 c2 r1 c2 r3 c1 r2 c2 r2 c3
r2 c3 r1 c3 r3 c1 r3 c2 r3 c3
The unique stable matching is ((r1, c1), (r2, c2), (r3, c3)). It is Pareto-dominated by a matching where r1
and r2 switch their countries: ((r1, c2), (r2, c1), (r3, c3)). This matching is not stable because (r3, c1) forms a
blocking pair.
Is asylum a context in which complete elimination of justified grievance should be ranked before
efficiency, or vice versa? This depends on which interpretation of priorities is deemed appropriate in
this context. Following [49], if the interpretation ought to be, “a refugee of higher priority in a country
is entitled to asylum in that country before a refugee with lower priority”, then we obtain elimination
of justified grievance because there cannot be blocking pairs. If priorities are interpreted in a weaker
sense and can be violated, exchanges as in Example 2 are possible which achieve efficient matchings
but at the cost of producing blocking pairs.
While there may be some leeway for policy makers to decide which criterion to prioritise (cf.
[7]), we anticipate that (ST) is important for the refugee match and normatively called for even if this
leads to some efficiency loss. In the example, the efficient matching assigns r3 to her least preferred
country even though she has higher priority in her first-choice country, c1, than r2 who is assigned to
it. Thus, the switch can be deemed unfair against r3 because it causes r3 to have justified grievance.
(ST) blocks such unfair switches. This suggests that the elimination of justified grievance can be
interpreted as a condition of fairness, whereas efficiency can be interpreted as a utilitarian criterion.
However, it is a trimmed utilitarian criterion that only takes into account the welfare of one side of
the market. If switches are possible as in the example, then countries could well complain by asking,
“why are priorities even collected in the first place”, and refuse to accept matches that are a result of
such switches. (ST), on the other hand, achieves fairness not only among refugees but also towards
countries because their priorities for refugees are respected.
14 The importance of strategy-proofness in the context of locally matching refugees is discussed in [6,9]. We should emphasise
that it is only when we insist on strategy-proofness that there is a drastic tradeoff between efficiency and stability in the SC
model; there is no such tradeoff when countries strategise because stable outcomes are efficient. See, e.g., [51]; we thank an
anonymous referee for raising this point.
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As mentioned in Section 3, in many contexts fairness also contributes to the thickness of markets,
giving agents incentives to participate in the system. In many contexts, if (ST) is violated, then the
lack of fairness leads agents to rematch and finally, to an unravelling of the system. In our context,
agents could be forced to participate in the system, and rematchings could perhaps be made impossible
(cf. [7]). Note also that of course fairness cannot prevent illegal secondary movements. Nevertheless, a
lack of fairness would likely lead to frustration with the redistribution system, which may, in turn,
reinforce incentives to engage in illegal movement to countries other than the one matched to, or to
vanish from the system altogether after learning about the matched destination country. Moreover,
if countries’ priorities are public information, then it is relatively easy for refugees to check whether
they are being treated unfairly. They would just need to ask others about their priorities and check
whether they are matched to a more preferred country. Such information flows can be expected to
be particularly high in the important stage when refugees are waiting in a hotspot or camp for their
relocation, and when it is crucial that they have confidence in the fairness of the system. Finally,
there may also be practical arguments that (ST) should be prioritised over efficiency. If justified
grievance is not completely eliminated, then there may be legal appeals from individuals who have a
justified grievance.
Discussion and Objections
The desiderata (ST), (MC), and (COM) can be jointly satisfied if priorities can be agreed to be
imposed in a certain way. Since it is assumed that everyone finds everyone else acceptable, (ST)
and (MC) can be mutually satisfied, and deferred acceptance algorithms solve for stable matchings
of maximum cardinality (the argument in Section 3 extends to this case). Moreover, priorities can
be formulated that satisfy (COM), and thus the two problems encountered in the previous section
can be resolved in the SC model. First, criteria must be agreed on for priorities that are acceptable.
For example, it seems reasonable that countries be allowed to prioritise refugees that speak their
language [7]. Some countries may still be keen to prioritise refugees on non-neutral properties such as
religion; this is why it is crucial to clearly determine which types of priorities are acceptable and which
are not. Doing so requires countries to give public reasons for the imposition of priority structures,
and possibly mediation by a confederation-level institution. This would also prevent countries from
being strategic, thereby adapting to the rules of the SC model.
Second, in addition to the specific needs of the refugees, relational factors between different host
countries can be taken into account so as to avoid the danger of favouritism due to homogeneity. In the
example where all refugees prefer country HI to country LO, suppose HI has a stronger economy than
LO, as measured in GDP per capita. Suppose, moreover, that all refugees are workers with identical
skills but half of them, r51–r100, are war-affected and unable to work. For fairness reasons among the
countries, humanitarian factors could be given a higher priority in HI and economic factors (such as
integrability into the labour market) a higher priority in LO, thus matching overproportionally many
refugees from r51–r100 to HI and overproportionally many refugees from r1–r50 to LO. This is again a
process that calls for negotiation and mediation by a higher-level institution.
If priorities are imposed as described above, (MC), (ST), and (COM) can be jointly satisfied using
deferred acceptance algorithms in the SC model. This model should thus be preferred to the CA model
in the context of asylum. However, there is a counterargument: this comes at the price of treating
asylum places as objects to be consumed by refugees. If a supranational institution is involved in the
decision as to which types of priorities are acceptable and which are not, national policy makers may
receive the impression that their national sovereignty is threatened under this model. On the face of
it, it seems more realistic to model countries as agents with preferences because their governments
clearly have preferences on issues of immigration. However, if the CA model appears more attractive
to national governments than the SC model, it may be difficult in practice to impose the latter as
an asylum policy whenever countries can voluntarily choose to participate in the system or have
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legislative co-determination.15 This may, the objection goes, provide a justified reason for why the EU
allows countries to express their preferences over refugees in the first place.
To counter this objection, remember what the European Commission seeks to achieve by allowing
countries to express preferences over refugees: to “facilitate their integration into the Member State of
relocation”. However, because of her private information, a refugee herself knows best where she will
thrive; namely, “refugees go and integrate where they have family, where they have community, or
where they think they can support themselves—in that order”.16 It can be assumed that this is also
the member states’ primary goal. However, for this objective, countries interested in their integration
will share refugees’ preferences to pool their families and communities and to integrate them into the
labour market. The SC model achieves this by collecting refugees’ preferences and allowing countries
to prioritise certain groups of refugees along neutral properties.
An even more important response to the objection is that the mandate for asylum should indeed
be handed from countries to higher-level institutions, and that one should gather public support
for this view. The protection of refugees is a public good, and, as such, suffers from insufficient
supply from the countries’ collective perspective [3,7,8]. An effective way to provide a supply of this
good which is more consistent with its social desirability is to move the mandate to a superordinate
government [40]. The other side of the coin is that this means to a certain extent depriving the countries
of the mandate. This policy would be contrary to the EU’s relocation mechanism, which seeks to
achieve good matchings by taking into account countries’ (but not refugees’) preferences. However, as
we have seen, problems abound with this mechanism. Moreover, the EU relocation system is similar
to the CA-model in that countries’ preferences are taken into account, and indeed suffers from similar
problems this model would bring about. In particular, what the Commission calls an “incorrect use of
preferences”—i.e., a violation of (COM)—would likely be shared in both systems. If this is true, the
malfunctioning of the current system may be seen as evidence against implementing a CA-model.
A supranational mandate for the asylum system has additional advantages. Importantly, it permits
a consistent definition of what counts as a justified asylum claim. A system that takes refugees’
preferences into account is more attractive for refugees than a system that does not. Such a system
can thus be expected to increase the demand for asylum. However, countries usually have an interest
in narrowing down the market, rather than provoking a bigger run on asylum. An effective way to
prevent this is to apply a clear-cut definition for the identification of justified asylum claims. However,
this is difficult to agree on by single states with diverse standards for asylum. In a nutshell, we need a
“communitarised” asylum system [50]. The SC but not the CA model takes a step in this direction.
6. Conclusions
Policy makers are increasingly interested in the question of which refugees to provide with asylum,
in addition to the question of how many. The fact that mechanisms for distributing refugees can be
designed in different ways gives rise to novel normative considerations. Reflecting on these has been
the aim of this paper.
Some distribution mechanisms, such as the relocation mechanism in effect in the EU, seek to
achieve good matches by taking countries’ or refugees’ preferences into account. We have argued that
doing so may reduce the number of refugees matched if refugees may declare countries unacceptable
or vice versa. However, to require that refugees accept any possible match presupposes that each
refugee’s rights be respected in all countries within the system—even in countries where they do not
end up living.
15 This is the case in the EU: in the context of resettlements participation is voluntary and in the context of relocations
participation is obligatory but countries have legislative co-determination through the Council.
16 The CEO of the refugee resettlement agency Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), quoted in [41]. In a similar vein, Rapoport
[52]: “numerous studies show that the best indicator of future integration of migrants is the preference they express for a
particular country”.
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Second, we argued that national governments should not express preferences over refugees.
Instead, priorities for refugees should be imposed according to humanitarian factors and fairness
considerations among the countries within the system. We then argued that fairness is normatively
called for and may in the context of distributing asylum beat efficiency considerations.
In terms of matching theory, we identified several reasons why asylum should not be modelled
as a College Admissions but as a School Choice problem. Results from matching theory also helped
to identify some of the problems that occur in the EU’s relocation mechanism. For example, the fact
that the mechanism does not systematically take refugees’ preferences into account leads to unstable
matchings and thereby violates fairness, which can be seen as a minimal condition for content. We
hope to have shown that matching theory provides important tools for allocation problems in which
agents’ preferences matter and, thus, for numerous problems of distributive justice.
Our aims have been normative: to reflect on the conditions under which it is a desirable policy
to take preferences into account, and whose preferences to take into account. More technical work
remains to be done for market designers, for example to design fair mechanisms for matching refugees
who migrate as families, and to investigate how relocation processes could be accelerated. Moreover,
more work remains to be done for policy makers, to impose fairer asylum policies by drawing on both
matching systems and on the kinds of normative considerations that have been proposed here.
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